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THE MORE THINGS STAY THE SAME:
WAITING ON INDIAN LAW'S
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
Stacy L. Leeds*




Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock' has been referred to as "the Indians' Dred Scott 2
decision."3 Although Dred Scott was a "negro[ ] of the African race,"4 and Lone
Wolf was a Kiowa of "the Indian race, 5 the similarities within these decisions are
chilling. Both relied on prevailing contemporaneous views of white racial
superiority to disregard constitutional claims by people of color. Both assigned
blame for the lack of enforceable rights to the people of color themselves.6
Consider the following quotations as a challenge, and identify whether they are
excerpted from Dred Scott or Lone Wolf:
* Visiting Associate Professor, University of Kansas School of Law. B.A., Washington
University; J.D., University of Tulsa College of Law; LL.M., University of Wisconsin School of Law.
The author also serves as Associate Justice, Cherokee Nation Judicial Appeals Tribunal (Supreme
Court). She wishes to thank her friends and colleagues on the faculty of the University of North
Dakota School of Law for their courage in support of the discontinuation of Native American mascots,
logos, and team names.
1. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
2. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
3. "The day Lone Wolf was handed down, January 5, 1903, might be called one of the blackest
days in the history of the American Indian, the Indians' Dred Scott decision." Sioux Nation of Indians
v. U.S., 601 F.2d 1157, 1173 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (Nichols, J., concurring), affd, sub nom. U.S. v. Sioux Nation
of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian
Tribes, 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 113, 182 (2002); Joseph William Singer, Well Settled?: The Increasing Weight of
History in American Indian Land Claims, 28 Ga. L. Rev. 481, 484 (1994); Sharon L. O'Brien, Freedom
of Religion in Indian Country, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 451, 480 n. 190 (1995).
4. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 403.
5. Id. The Dred Scott decision distinguishes Africans from Indians for purposes of possible
inclusion into the political process. Id. at 403-04.
6. In Lone Wolf, Congress would not have the power to change the status of landholdings were it
not for the Indians' dependant status. See 187 U.S. at 567. Likewise, slaves were under the subjugation
of white society because they were inferior and subordinate beings. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404-05.
1
Leeds: The More Things Stay the Same: Waiting on Indian Law's Brown v. B
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2002
TULSA LAW REVIEW
"[T]hey were at that time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings,
who had been subjugated by the dominant race ... " 7
"[T]he course of events has brought [them] ... under subjection to the white
race ..."
"It is to be presumed that in this matter the United States would be governed by
such considerations of justice as would control a Christian people in their treatment
of an ignorant and dependant race." 9
The quotations cumulatively classify the white Christian inhabitants of the
United States as a race that rightfully dominates the ignorant, inferior,
subordinate, and dependant African and Indian races. This hierarchical structure
led to the ultimate similarity between Dred Scott and Lone Wolf. In both
instances, the Supreme Court refused to address the substantive legal claims of the
litigants on the basis of the political question doctrine.' ° On this point, the Dred
Scott and Lone Wolf language is virtually interchangeable:
"[T]he propriety or justice of [Congress'] action towards the Indians... is a question
of governmental policy .. ."11 (Lone Wolf)
"It is not the province of the court to decide upon the justice or injustice, the policy
or impolicy, of these laws. The decision of that question belonged to the political or
law-making power .... 1 2 (Dred Scott)
"We must presume that Congress acted in perfect good faith ... and that the
legislative branch of the government exercised its best judgment in the premises."' 3
(Lone Wolf)
Despite these similarities, the two cases depart in their longevity as
precedent and their present day applicability. Dred Scott was superceded by
constitutional amendments. Dred Scott's legacy decision, Plessy v. Ferguson,4 was
eventually overruled by Brown v. Board of Education.1 5 Lone Wolf, however, is
controlling authority routinely cited by the current United States Supreme Court.'
6
7. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404-05 (discussing why Africans did not fall within the words "people of
the United States" at the time the Constitution was drafted).
8. Id. at 404 (distinguishing between the legal rights of Indians and Africans on the issue of
potential inclusion within the United States political process as full citizens).
9. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565 (quoting Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877)); Id. at 567
(describing Indians as merely "wards" to whom federal governmental policy unquestionably applies).
10. The political question doctrine places certain issues outside the realm of judicial inquiry for
resolution by the legislative branch or otherwise through the political processes. For a more complete
description of the political question doctrine, see generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
11. 187 U.S. at 565.
12. 60 U.S. at 405.
13. 187 U.S. at 568.
14. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 1 refer to Plessy as a legacy decision of Dred Scott because it imposes the
same power structure of supremacy and inferiority. See D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible: Law,
Metaphor, and the Racial Self, 82 Geo. L.J. 437, 454 (1993).
15. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16. See Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 404 (1994), for an example of current reliance on Lone Wolf.
Professor Clinton sets up this paradox in his most recent law review article. Clinton demonstrates the
absurdity of the Supreme Court's present reliance on cases such as Kagama and Lone Wolf and their
[Vol. 38:73
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In today's decisions, it is no longer acceptable for the United States Supreme
Court to refer to a racial group as "a subordinate and inferior class of beings."' 7
We will likely never read another Supreme Court decision that blatantly
rationalizes disenfranchisement on the basis that a group is "so far inferior, that
they [have] no rights which the white man [is] bound to respect.' 8  Unless,
perhaps, the United States Supreme Court is deciding an Indian law case."
Section two of this essay will explore the rationalizations of Indian racial
inferiority found in Lone Wolf. Section three will demonstrate how, after one
hundred years, the Court continues to rely on Lone Wolf s rationales to uphold
congressional plenary power and the unilateral abrogation of treaties. Section
four will reveal how the Court not only relies on decisions founded on racist
premises, but also continues to employ racist rationales for judicially divesting
tribes of power. This analysis will demonstrate how racism, at times shockingly
blatant, remains pervasive in decisions from Lone Wolf through the 2001 Term of
the United States Supreme Court. Finally, this essay will conclude by suggesting
why federal Indian law has not seen its Brown v. Board of Education.2°
II. LONE WOLF FOR THE SOCRATIC, THE HISTORIAN AND THE CYNIC
The facts of Lone Wolf do not speak well of the United States' treatment of
Indians. At the center of the case was a treaty establishing a reservation for
permanent settlement of the Kiowa and Comanche tribes.2' The treaty
guaranteed that no subsequent land transactions would be valid unless approved
by three-fourths of the adult Indian male residents of the reservation.22 Congress,
however, passed a statute taking the lands owned by the tribal government and
racial superiority arguments, and draws an excellent analogy: What if the current Supreme Court cited
Dred Scott or Plessy to control the outcome of a modern affirmative action claim? Clinton, supra n. 3,
at 199. Where this essay departs from Professor Clinton's piece is in its focus. This essay focuses less
on the continued use of Lone Wolf as precedent and emphasizes instead the Supreme Court's
continued use of racial superiority arguments to divest tribal authority.
17. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404-05.
18. Id. at 407.
19. See infra notes 55-56 for examples of historical, racist case language appearing in modern court
opinions.
20. 347 U.S. 483. Brown rejected the notion that one class of society is inferior and therefore
entitled to inferior access. Id. I am not suggesting that Indian people seek integration into the
American political process, but that an Indian law Brown v. Board of Education would put an end to
the Court's reliance on race-based rationales for the divestiture of tribal autonomy and self-
determination rights.
21. 187 U.S. at 553.
22. Treaty with the Kiowa and Comanche (The Treaty of Medicine Lodge), art. XII (Oct. 21, 1867),
15 Stat. 581, 585:
No treaty for the cession of any portion or part of the reservation herein described, which
may be held in common, shall be of any validity or force as against the said Indians, unless
executed and signed by at least three fourths of all the adult male Indians occupying the
same, and no cession by the tribe shall be understood or construed in such manner as to
deprive, without his consent, any individual member of the tribe of his rights to any tract of
land selected by him as provided in article III [VII of this treaty.
3
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23redistributing the lands to various individuals, Indian and non-Indian alike. The
requisite three-fourths assent was never obtained." Principal Chief Lone Wolf of
the Kiowa Nation, along with other tribal governmental officials, sought to
invalidate the statute under the Fifth Amendment, arguing that the redistribution
was an inappropriate taking of property interests without compensation.
25
In a manner reminiscent of its Dred Scott decision, the Supreme Court
sidestepped all substantive judicial inquiry into the presumption that Congress
26acted in "perfect good faith" in passing the legislation. The judiciary would not
"question or inquire into the motives, 27 of Congress in this matter. Such
congressional action was deemed a constitutionally appropriate exercise of
"[p]lenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians."2  This "plenary
authority" included the power to unilaterally abrogate provisions of Indian
treaties.
29
Each time I cover Lone Wolf while teaching a federal Indian law class, my
outrage, as an Indian person subject to plenary power, intensifies.
"Where does this plenary power come from?" I ask my law students.
Scanning the classroom for responses, while in turn seeing blank stares and
wrinkled brows, I, the Socratic professor, respond to my own question with a
further question: "What legal authority or precedent does the Court cite in
reference to this plenary power?"
The historian in me then asks: "Have we ever discussed a previous case
where the word 'plenary' is used?" The historian-me follows up, "Perhaps
someone should do a search of old case law tonight to find out when the word
'plenary' was first used with respect to congressional authority in Indian
relations."
The cynical-me sarcastically questions, "Did they just make it up?"
23. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 555-57, 560 (Lands were redistributed from the tribal government to
tribal citizens. Other lands were labeled "surplus" lands for which the tribes were compensated at
prices below what the tribe requested. These surplus lands were then patented to non-Indian settlers.).
24. Id. at 557. The Secretary of the Interior confessed to the Senate that the three-fourths required
signatures were not obtained:
If eighteen years and over be held to be the legal age of those who were authorized to sign
the agreement, the number of persons who actually signed was 87 less than three fourths of
the adult male membership of the tribes; and if twenty-one years be held to be the minimum
age, then 23 less than three fourths signed the agreement. In either event, less than three
fourths of the male adults appear to have so signed.
Id.
25. Id. at 564. The property interest allegedly taken was the tribes interest in lands held in common
within the reservation, an interest guaranteed by Article 12 of the treaty. Id. It can be argued that the
tribe received just compensation for the surplus lands discussed. See supra n. 23. However, the tribes
did not receive compensation for lands taken from the tribal government and redistributed to tribal
members. Id.
26. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 568.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 565.
29. Id. at 566.
[Vol. 38:73
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A. Answering the Socratics
To support plenary power, the Lone Wolf Court concluded it "has been
exercised by Congress from the beginning."3 ° Then, on the question of whether
legislation that directly violated treaty provisions should be upheld, the Court
concluded that when "treaties were entered into between the United States and a
tribe of Indians it was never doubted that the power to abrogate existed in
Congress .... ,31 In coming to this conclusion, the Court relied heavily upon
United States v. Kagama,32 a case decided less than twenty years before Lone Wolf.
The Court quoted Kagama to assert that Congress had the power "from the
beginning" to unilaterally abrogate treaties.33 However, there was no treaty at
issue in Kagama and the word "plenary" is absent altogether. Kagama's
language did, nevertheless, substantiate Lone Wolf s premise that Indians are
dependent:
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on
the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their
political rights .... From their very weakness and helplessness.., arises the duty of
protection, and with it the power .... 35
The power of the general government over these remnants of a race once powerful,
now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to
the safety of those among whom they dwell.
36
The Kagama quotes employed by Justice White speak predominately to the
dependency, weakness, and inferiority of the Indian race as justification for
congressional plenary authority that was not in conflict with Indians' interest but
used for the Indians' own good.
B. Researching for the Historians
And what of the word "plenary?" Although mysteriously absent from
Kagama, is it used in any prior Indian cases?
The term "plenary" does emerge in a few, less publicized cases prior to Lone
Wolf. In 1899, the Supreme Court addressed four appeals regarding individual
applications of citizenship enrollment to the Cherokee Nation.37 The appeals
came from the United States District Court that was established in the Indian
territories, and most of those cases came to that court on appeal from the "Dawes
Commission, though some were [appeals from the] tribunal courts."" Ruling on
30. Id. at 565.
31. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566 (emphasis in original).
32. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
33. Id. at 565.
34. Professor Clinton discusses the Kagama decision at length, Clinton, supra n. 3, at 170-79, and
cites Kagama as the "intellectual origin" of plenary power. Id. at 195.
35. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 567 (quoting Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383-84).
36. Id.
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the contention that the Indian Apportionment Act of July 1, 1898, 39 which
extended remedial appeal to the Supreme Court, was invalid because of its
retrospective application, the Court stated that:
[A]ssuming that congress [sic] possesses plenary power of legislation in regard to
[Indian tribes], subject only to the constitution of the United States, it follows that
the validity of remedial legislation of this sort cannot be questioned unless in
violation of some prohibition of that instrument.
4 0
The Court held that the tribes were subject to the power and authority of the
United States, specifically when Congress may choose, and that because of "the
power of congress in the premises having the plenitude thus indicated," the Act
was not unconstitutional.41
Plenary power was also used outside the field of federal Indian law, where
the Supreme Court invoked it in immigration cases.42 When the Court invoked
plenary power in immigration cases, they used it to deny Chinese and other "non-
white" immigrants entry into the United States.43
C. Review for the Cynics
Did the United States Supreme Court simply invent congressional plenary
power? Was it anything more than justification for colonial acquisition of yet
more Indian land? It is notably curious that Lone Wolfs predecessor, Kagama,
squarely denies any constitutional authority to regulate internal tribal matters, yet
upholds legislation allowing federal prosecution of crimes committed by Indians
on tribal land.44 It is equally curious that Lone Wolf permits Congress to take and
redistribute land without tribal consent, against treaty guarantees, and without
citation to any constitutional source of legislative authority. What, then, can the
cynic conclude is the ultimate source of congressional plenary authority? It seems
to have emerged from thin air against a backdrop of Indian wardship and racial
inferiority.
III. LONE WOLF'S LEGACY:
RACE-BASED JUSTIFICATIONS IN MODERN SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The race-based rationales used in Lone Wolf still persist in modern-day
Supreme Court opinions issued in Indian law cases. Indeed, Justice Reed's
39. Indian Appropriation Act, 30 Stat. 571 (1898).
40. Stephens, 174 U.S at 477-78.
41. Id. at 486.
42. See Chae Chan Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Fong Yue Ting v. U.S., 149 U.S. 698 (1893);
Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race Law, 88 Cal.
L. Rev. 1923, 1944-47 (2000).
43. See Harris, supra n. 42, at 1944-47.
44. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 379-80 ("While we are not able to see in either of these clauses of the
constitution and its amendments any delegation of power to enact a code of criminal law for the
punishment of [Indians].... But this power of congress to organize territorial governments, and make
laws for their inhabitants, arises, not so much from the clause in the constitution ... as from the
ownership of the country in which the territories are, and the right of exclusive sovereignty which must
exist in the national government, and can be found nowhere else.") (citations omitted).
[Vol. 38:73
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opinion in Tee-Hi-Ton Indians v. United States,45 Justice Rehnquist's opinion in
46Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, and Justice Souter's concurring opinion in
Nevada v. Hicks47 are all tainted with racial undertones, suggesting race played a
part in the opinions. These three opinions are chosen for a number of reasons.
First, Tee-Hi-Ton is selected as a case from the era of Brown v. Board of
Education as a comparison of countervailing views on the Court. In chronological
progression, Oliphant follows Tee-Hit-Ton by twenty-three years, and Hicks
follows Oliphant by twenty-three years. These three cases demonstrate the
Court's prolific reliance on race-based rationales over a time period that is
otherwise marked by cyclical shifts in federal Indian policy.
For example, Tee-Hi-Ton was decided in the federal Indian policy era known
as "Termination., 48 This era was marked by legislative enactments designed to
end federal recognition of numerous tribal governments. Oliphant and Hicks, on
the other hand, were decided during the federal government's policy of "self-
determination, 49 which purported to respect and promote tribal autonomy. Yet
despite the shifts in federal policy dictated by the executive and legislative
branches, the Court continued not only to rely on precedent from the Lone Wolf
era, but also to perpetuate racist rationales by employing new versions of racial
justifications.
The three cases were also selected for their detrimental effect on the rights
of tribes. As a matter of federal Indian law, Tee-Hi-Ton held that Alaska native
villages were not entitled to compensation for the. extinguishment of aboriginal
title. 50 As a matter of federal Indian law, Oliphant held that tribes were implicitly
divested of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.51 As a matter of federal Indian
law, Hicks held that tribal courts lacked adjudicatory authority over the conduct of
state law enforcement officers on tribal land.52
When these cases are considered from the Indian perspective, in light of both
Lone Wolfs premises and the race-based justifications for the divestiture of tribal
rights they all employ, the holdings translate to me as:
"The doctrine of conquest is alive and well." (Tee-Hi-Ton)
"Brown people don't put white people in jail."53 (Oliphant)
"If brown people want to sue police officers for violating their civil rights, they'll
have to do it in a white court." (Hicks)
45. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
46. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
47. 533 U.S. 353, 375-86 (2001).
48. See Vine Deloria, Jr. & Clifford M. Lytle, American Indians, American Justice 15-21 (U. Tex.
Press 1983).
49. See id. at 21-24.
50. 348 U.S. 272.
51. 435 U.S. 191.
52. 533 U.S. 353.
53. Credit for this perspective is warmly extended to Professor G. William Rice of the University of
Tulsa College of Law who employed it with great effect during my days under his pupilage.
2002]
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A. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States
The year following Brown v. Board of Education, the United States Supreme
Court decided Tee-Hit-Ton.54 In Tee-Hit-Ton, the Court rejected the tribe's Fifth
Amendment Takings claim, employing the same principles set forth in Lone Wolf,
citing identical passages to render the taking of tribal land nonjusticiable:
The grantee, it is true, would take only the naked fee, and could not disturb the
occupancy of the Indians; that occupancy could only be interfered with or
determined by the United States. It is to be presumed that in this matter the United
States would be governed by such considerations of justice as would control a
Christian people in their treatment of an ignorant and dependent race.
55
The Tee-Hit-Ton Court did not, however, stop at reliance on a racially-
charged historic case. Instead, the Court continued by employing its own, equally
racist language. Justice Reed expounded his rationale for continuing the
application of discovery and conquest principles as:
Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this continent were
deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and that, even when the Indians ceded
millions of acres by treaty in return for blankets, food and trinkets, it was not a sale
but the conquerors' will that deprived them of their land.
56
Justice Reed was not quoting a case from the late 1800s or the early 1900s.
His explanation represented the contemporaneous attitude of the Supreme Court
toward Indians as inferior peoples subject to the dominion of the United States.
Although a dissenting opinion followed, 7 it disagreed with the majority over the
legal interpretation of the Alaska Organic Act s rather than the Court's continuing
reliance on the doctrine of discovery and conquest. Nor did the dissent criticize
the majority opinion's description of Indians as savages with poor negotiation
skills. The nature of the dissent is telling when compared to those from Plessy v.
Ferguson and Korematsu v. United States,59 a decision which upheld Japanese
internment during World War II. The dissenting opinions from each of these
cases criticized the majority for its race-based rationalizations and foreshadowed
the possibility of social change. Tee-Hit-Ton's dissent made no reference to racial
stereotyping and no criticism of the reliance on racially charged precedent.
Given the racial climate of the 1950s, Justice Reed's statements would be
somewhat understandable if Tee-Hit-Ton marked the near end of reliance on race-
based justifications. After all, it was not for a number of years after Brown that
54. 348 U.S. 272.
55. Id. at 281 (citing Beecher, 95 U.S. at 525). This passage is also cited in Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at
565.
56. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 289-90 (emphasis added). Professor Clinton refers to this notion as one
of the greatest myths, noting that the military defeat, at the hands of the United States military, was the
exception rather than the rule in Indian country. See Clinton, supra n. 3, at 165. In fact, in Tee-Hit-
Ton, the United States had no claim of actual conquest.
57. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 291-95 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
58. Alaska Organic Act, 23 Stat. 24 (1884).
59. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
[Vol. 38:73
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mainstream society was willing to accept desegregation.60 But statements similar
to Justice Reed's did not stop in the 1950s. More recent Supreme Court decisions
continue to use race-based rationalizations for the divesture of tribal authority. 61
B. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe
Twenty-three years after Tee-Hit-Ton, the Supreme Court decided Oliphant,
holding that Indian tribes were divested of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.62
Congress, despite its plenary power articulated in Lone Wolf, had passed no
statute that would divest tribes of criminal jurisdiction in this scenario. 63  The
Suquamish Indian Tribe had never relinquished criminal jurisdiction to the United
States by treaty. Nonetheless, the Court deemed the tribe, and consequentially all
Indian tribes, to be divested of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. What was
the Court's rationale? That it would be "'inconsistent with [the tribe's] status."
' 64
And what does the opinion say of the tribe's status? It says that Indians are
dependent, and their tribal courts are biased.
With respect to tribal courts, the Court noted that the principle that non-
Indians should not be subject to tribal criminal jurisdiction would have been
"obvious" a century ago, because "Indian tribes were characterized by a 'want of
fixed laws [and] of competent tribunals of justice.' 65 But even though today's
tribal courts "embody dramatic advances over their historical antecedents, 66 the
Court deems the principle "no less obvious today.,
67
The Court's disrespect for and fear of Indian tribal courts is manifest
throughout the opinion. First, the case references an 1883 Supreme Court case,
Ex parte Crow Dog,6 s to caution against subjecting non-Indians to Indian courts.69
A quotation is used to note that, if subjected to Indian courts, non-Indians would
be tried "not by their peers, nor by the customs of their people, nor the law of
their land, but by... a different race, according to the law of a social state of
which they have an imperfect conception."70 Crow Dog dealt with whether an
Indian could be prosecuted in federal court for killing another Indian within
Indian country following adjudication at the tribal level. 71  Crow Dog was
60. In fact, given the recent remarks of former Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, it may be argued
that acceptance of desegregation is still forthcoming.
61. See supra notes 55-56 for examples of historical, racist case language appearing in modern court
opinions.
62. 435 U.S. 191.
63. 187 U.S. 553. In fact, even with the passage of the Major Crimes Act, 23 Stat. 385 (1885), the
legislation at issue in Kagama, Congress did not divest tribes of criminal jurisdiction. The Major
Crimes Act merely established jurisdiction without reference to, or divestiture of, tribal jurisdiction.
64. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208 (quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976)
(emphasis added)).
65. Id. at 210 (quoting H.R. Rpt. 23-474, at 18 (May 20, 1834)).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
69. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210-11.
70. Id. at 210-11 (quoting Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 571).
71. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556.
2002]
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immediately followed by the passage of the Major Crimes Act,72 which subjected
Indians to federal court prosecution, usually with non-Indian juries.
Following the Crow Dog discussion, the Oliphant Court next turned to the
issue of whether non-Indians were afforded basic due process rights in tribal
courts. The Court noted that "some Indian tribal court systems have become
increasingly sophisticated and resemble in many respects their state
counterparts"73 and that after the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,74
"many of the dangers that might have accompanied the exercise by tribal courts of
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians only a few decades ago have disappeared. 75
The concerns of the Oliphant Court, although more subtle than Tee-Hit-
Ton's "savage" imagery, suggest a number of racists concepts. First, that tribal
courts are inferior to non-Indian courts. Second, that non-Indian judiciaries
provide a superior form of justice, which tribal court systems should strive to
emulate. Finally, that tribal courts and Indian judges are unfair, and will fail to
extend basic rights to non-Indians. What else could be meant by "the many
dangers" of tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians?
C. Nevada v. Hicks
Twenty-three years later, the Court decided Hicks, which incorporates many
76
of Oliphant's rationales into the context of civil jursdiction. Hicks continued the
Supreme Court's implicit divesture of tribal authority absent congressional
enactment or treaty provision. The Court held that tribal courts lack civil
adjudicatory jurisdiction for claims involving state officers, even when the alleged
conduct occurs on tribally-owned lands.77
The case is heavily criticized and questioned by scholars and commentators
78
as an intellectually dishonest application of federal Indian law principles. Justice
Souter's concurring opinion employs veiled rationales of tribal inferiority.
Specifically, he suggests that tribal courts are inferior to state, federal, or non-
Indian forums. 79 This discussion begins, like Oliphant, on the notion that non-
Indians need to be protected from tribal courts. "The ability of nonmembers to
72. 23 Stat. 385.
73. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211-12.
74. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (1968).
75. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212.
76. Richard E. James, Student Author, Sanctuaries No More: The United States Supreme Court
Deals Another Blow to Indian Tribal Court Jurisdiction, 41 Washburn L.J. 347, 356 (2002) (Hicks built
on Oliphant, which had already severed the tie between the situs of the crime and the jurisdiction when
non-members are involved); David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of
States' Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 267, 333 (2001).
77. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353.
78. Melanie Reed, Student Author, Native American Sovereignty Meets a Bend in the Road:
Difficulties in Nevada v. Hicks, 2002 BYU L. Rev. 137, 169 (2002) (discussing how the ruling is contrary
to well-established precedent); N. Bruce Duthu & Dean B. Suagee, Supreme Court Strikes Two More
Blows against Tribal Self-Determination, 16 Nat. Resources & Envtl. 118, 119 (Fall 2001) (the Court
manipulates its recent precedents to reach its results while ignoring precedents that support tribal
authority).
79. flicks, 533 U.S. at 376 (Souter, J., concurring).
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know where tribal jurisdiction begins and ends, it should be stressed, is a matter of
real, practical consequence given '[t]he special nature of [Indian] tribunals."'
80
What exactly is the "special nature" of tribal courts?
Justice Souter's attention then focuses on how tribal courts are different, and
impliedly inferior, to non-Indian courts. He reiterates Oliphant's policy
considerations of "an overriding concern that citizens who are not tribal members
'be protected ... from unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty.' 8' He
also notes that tribal courts "differ from traditional American courts in a number
of significant respects," including the inapplicability of the United States Bill of
82Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion briefly mentions the
Indian Civil Rights Act to note its guarantees are not identical to the
Constitution.83 Souter's opinion conveys a fear that tribal courts will disregard the
rights of non-Indians and that the United States cannot step in to ensure
constitutional rights.8' Ignored in both Hicks and Oliphant is that the Indian Civil
Rights Act ensures that federal law affords all defendants (especially non-Indians)
greater rights in tribal criminal courts than in state courts.
The fear factor would be dampened if the opinions revealed that defendants
in tribal courts, unlike those in state courts, have guaranteed habeas review in a
federal district court and that tribal courts are prohibited from imposing a
sentence in excess of one year or fines in excess of five thousand dollars.8' And
finally, all defendants in tribal court, unlike state court, have the right to a jury
81trial, even in misdemeanor cases.
The comparison of tribal courts to "other American courts" continues
beyond the need to protect the rights of non-Indians into an implied inferiority of
tribal judiciaries:
Tribal courts also differ from other American courts (and often from one other) in
their structure, in the substantive law they apply, and in the independence of their
judges. Although some modern tribal courts "mirror American courts" and "are
guided by written codes, rules, procedures and guidelines," tribal law is still
frequently unwritten, being based instead "on the values, mores, and norms of a
tribe and expressed in its customs, traditions, and practices," and is often "handed
down orally or by example from one generation to another." The resulting law
applicable in tribal courts is a complex "mix of tribal codes and federal, state and
traditional law," which would be unusually difficult for an outsider to sort out.
88
80. Id. at 383 (quoting Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990)).
81. Id. at 384 (quoting Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210).
82. Id. at 383.
83. Id. at 384.
84. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 384-85.
85. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2000).
86. Id. § 1302(7).
87. Id. § 1302(10).
88. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 384 (quoting Ada Pecos Melton, Indigenous Justice Systems and Tribal
Society, 79 Judicature 126, 130-31 (1995) and Natl. Am. Indian Ct. Judges Assn. et al., Indian Courts
and the Future: Report of the NAICJA Long Range Planning Project 43 (Natl. Am. Indian Ct. Judges
Assn. 1978) (citations omitted)).
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At least two aspects of the foregoing quotes beg discussion. The first
reference to judicial independence suggests that tribal judges are influenced by
politics to a larger extent than judges of "other American courts." This implies
that tribal judges are incapable of the same objectivity and professionalism
exercised by non-Indian judges, and at a deeper level of inquiry ponders whether
tribal judges possess comparable intellectual capacity to their non-Indian
counterparts.
Second, the reference to unwritten law and reliance on tradition and custom
suggests that tribal legal precedent and tribal common law are less substantiated
and lack credibility in comparison to "real" laws applied by "other American
courts." Each of these references contains not-so-underlying messages of Indian
inferiority, if not as a race of people, then as inferior governments of second-rate
laws.
Justice Souter offers one final commentary on tribal courts in his parade of
horribles. Should tribal courts be recognized as an appropriate forum to
adjudicate tort claims against state officers for civil rights abuses occurring on
tribal land? "The result, of course, is a risk of substantial disuniformity in the
interpretation of state and federal law, a risk underscored by the fact that '[t]ribal
courts are often subordinate to the political branches of tribal governments.' ' 89
He ends, as he began, with a reference to judicial independence and inferior
governmental structure.
IV. CONCLUSION
Why does race continue to be a pivotal justification for divestiture of tribal
authority? Or, why has Indian law yet to see a comparable Brown v. Board of
Education? I offer three interrelated reasons. First is the fact that subtlety is an
art form well crafted by the United States Government. Second, United States
colonization of Indian country has been largely successful and continues to be
pervasive. And finally, the effects of colonization and the perfection of subtle
racism has created an American public that suffers from a lack of outrage when it
comes to American Indian issues.
The Supreme Court, and our society as a whole, has become increasingly
well-versed in the art of subtlety to mask racism. 0 An offspring of our society's
"political correctness" industry is the art of masking one's beliefs in words and
phrases that are acceptable to the mainstream society. Words change, attitudes do
not.
Compare the language used in Tee-Hit-Ton to the words employed in
Oliphant or Hicks in light of political correctness and contemporary legal issues.
The Court can no longer write "every American schoolboy knows" the court
systems of the "savage" tribes are too inferior to hear certain claims.9 But the
89. Id. at 385 (quoting Duro, 495 U.S. at 693) (quotation marks omitted).
90. See Margaret E. Montoya, Of "Subtle Prejudices," White Supremacy, and Affirmative Action: A
Reply to Paul Butler, 68 U. Colo. L. Rev. 891 (1997).
91. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 289.
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Court can and does write that it is "obvious" the tribes cannot hear certain claims
because of "the special nature" of their tribal judiciaries.92 Words have been
altered, but their underlying meaning has not.
Why is it that a few Indian law scholars and a handful of Indian people are
the only people seemingly outraged by the Supreme Court's continued use of
racist rationales to divest tribes of authority, even when these subtleties are
revealed to others? The ongoing colonization process has desensitized the
American public, including many tribal leaders. As kids in public school, we were
all one of those "American schoolboys" that Justice Reed referenced in Tee-Hit-
Ton. We learned of "Happy Pilgrims. Happy Indians. 9 3 Today, our children's
knowledge of Indian people derives from Walt Disney's Pocahontas or from their
local sports team: "the Redskins" or "the Fighting Sioux." To the majority of
Americans, Indians are not real people, except for the ones with casinos or the
ones that "choose" to live in poverty on a reservation. Each of these perceptions
is perpetuated, consciously or unconsciously, as a part of the ongoing colonization
process.
The latest census data reports American Indians constitute approximately
one percent9 4 of the United States population. It has always been difficult to
generate support from the majority for the benefit of minority issues, particularly
in a time of political apathy or contempt toward a particular minority group. This
is a truth that Japanese-Americans felt in the 1940s.95 This is a truth many Arab-
Americans are undoubtedly facing today. It is the ongoing reality of Indian
people.
Brown v. Board of Education happened at the beginning of a period in our
history when the American people were forced to face the realities of race-based
injustice. The images of armed national guardsmen, water hoses, and bombings
are now engrained in our national psyche. These images served as catalysts for
social change. But change did not occur until the American people were forced to
consciously face the issues. The American public has no visual image of the
92. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 383.
93. Milner S. Ball, Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2280, 2296
(1989).
94. See U.S. Census Bureau, Quick Tables <http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_ts=
50442067882> (accessed Sept. 18, 2002).
95. For a primer of majority attitudes towards Japanese internees, see Alison Dundes Renteln, A
Psychohistorical Analysis of the Japanese American Internment, 17 Human Rights 0. 618 (1995):
A common stereotype was that Japanese Americans were un-American. They were not and
could never be properly assimilated into the American way of life. An example of this
perception is found in the testimony of V.S. McClatchy, a powerful figure in the Japanese
Exclusion League who lobbied for an immigration law to exclude "Orientals:"
The Japanese are less assimilable and more dangerous as residents in this country than
any other of the peoples ineligible under our laws... with great pride of race, they have
no idea of assimilating in the sense of amalgamation. They do not come here with any
desire or any intent to lose their racial or national identity. They come here specifically
and professedly for the purpose of colonizing and establishing here permanently the
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Cherokee death march96 or the slaughter of women and children in the Northern
Plains. One of the most pervasive images of Indian dehumanization in
contemporary American society is the smiling Chief Wahoo of Major League
Baseball's Cleveland Indians. This suggests, as comparative imagery, that the
American Indians are respected today as African-Americans were respected
during a time period where Sambos and minstrel shows were commonly
acceptable. Perhaps the major conceptual difference is in the rhetoric of the
respective imagery. Unlike the present Indian mascot debate, it was likely seldom
argued that the Aunt Jamima and Sambo images were perpetuated to "honor"
African-Americans.
This essay began with a James Baldwin quote that inspired my thoughts:
"Not everything that is faced can be changed, but nothing can be changed until it is
faced." As students of Indian law, we cut our teeth on the distinctions between
Indian law and "everything else." As Indian people, we are told that we are
treated differently, not because of a racial distinction, but because of our political
classification.97 While each of these propositions possess elements of legal truth,
more attention must be placed on that which has not been adequately revealed:
the majority of Indian law decisions from Chief Justice Marshall's trilogy98 to Lone
Wolf to the Rehnquist Court are premised on notions of racial supremacy of the
United States over the perceived inferiority and dependency of Indian people.
Until we can discuss this openly in the Indian law circles, in the mainstream legal
community, and in our classrooms, an Indian law Brown v. Board of Education
decision will not be possible.
96. The Cherokee death march I refer to has otherwise been romanticized as the "Trail of Tears,"
which gets cursory mention in most history text.
97. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 n. 24 (1974).
98. Worcester v. Ga., 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Ga., 30 U.S. 1 (1831); Johnson v.
McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
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